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No. 7391 
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STATEMENT 
This is an appeal from the judgment of the lower court 
rendered on the 2nd day of February, 1949, in favor of 
the defendant W. Ed Bingham and against the plaintiff 
''no cause of action.'' 
The facts as shown by the pleadings are : 
That the appellant, Wilbert J. Dawson, was and is 
the father of Lawrence P. Dawson, 'vho was of the ap-
proxiinate age of nine (9) years at the time of his death 
on ?\fay 8, 1948, 'vhen he was struck and killed by a car 
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driven by the defendant Guy Elias Carr at the intersec-
tion of Highway U-38 and 4800 South Street in Weber 
County, Utah, after having just alighted from a school 
bus owned by Weber County School District and driven 
by the respondent W. Ed Bingham, who was then and 
there an employee of the defendant School District. 
The school bus had been proceeding northward on 
Highway U-38 and had been stopped on the southeast 
corner of the intersection of that highway with 4800 
South Street. It was stopped in such a position that the 
school children thereon, when leaving the bus, were com-
pelled, by reason of a ditch bank, grass and weeds, to 
walk around the front end of the bus into 4800 South 
Street in order to proceed westward along that street. 
The boy Lawrence P. Dawson walked around the front 
end of the bus, into 4800 South Street and proceeded 
westward across Highway U-38 toward his home, which 
was west of the highway on 4800 South Street, when he 
was struck by an automobile driven northward on High-
way U-38 by the defendant Guy Elias Carr and killed. 
The place and n1anner of the stopping of the bus by 
the respondent W. Ed Bingham was· contrary to the 
Regulations Governing Pupil Transportation and School 
Bus Standards of the Utah Stat8 Road Commission 
adopted June, 1947, in conformity with Section 57-7-176 
of Utah Code Annotated, 1943, by and with the advice 
of the State Board of Education, the pertinent excerpts 
of which Regulations are hereinafter set out (p. 8, 9 of 
this brief). 
The respondent denied that the place or 1nanner of 
his stopping the bus was wrongful. 
The complaint of the plaintiff was dismissed as to the 
-··44{ 2 ~,._ 
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defendant Board of Education upon demurrer. 
The trial of the cause as against the defendants Guy 
Elias Carr and W. Ed Bingham resulted in a verdict in 
favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant Guy 
Elias Carr in the an1ount of $5,000.00 and a seperate 
verdict in favor of the defendant W. Ed Bingham and 
against the plaintiff "no cause of action." 
The judgment against the defendant Guy Elias Carr 
has been satisfied, with a full reservation of appellant's 
rights against W. Ed Bingham, the respondent herein. 
STATEMENT OF ERRORS 
A statement of errors upon which appellant relies for 
reversal of the judgment and decree of the District Court 
of the Second Judicial District of the State of Utah with-
in and for Weber County, is as follows: 
1. That the court erred in denying appellant's re-
quested instruction Number 13, as follows: 
"You are instructed that it was the duty of the 
defendant, W. Ed Bingham, to require the children 
to pass behind rather than in front of his bus. If you 
find fro1n the evidence that he did not do so, then 
you will find that his failure so to do was negligence 
as a matter of la-\v, and you will find in favor of the 
plaintiff and against said defendant.'' 
2. That the court erred in denying appellant's re-
quested instruction Number 14, as follows: 
"You are instructed that if you find from the evi-
dence that the defendant, vV. Ed Bingham, did not 
require the deceased child, Lavvrence P. Dawson, to 
pass behind rather than in front of the bus, that said 
defendant was guilty of misconduct as a matter of 
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law. Upon such a finding by you, you are further in-
structed that that misconduct on the part of said de-
fendant overcomes any question of contributory neg-
gligence on the part of the deceased child, Lawrence 
P. Dawson, and you will then give no consideration 
whatever to any question of contributory negligence 
on the part of said child.'' 
3. That the court erred in denying appellant's re-
quested instruction Number 19, as follows: 
"You are instructed that children must be ex-
pected to act upon childish instincts and impulses; 
and others who are chargeable with a duty of care 
and caution towards them must calculate upon this 
and take precautions accordingly.'' 
. 4. That the court erred in denying appellant's re-
quested instruction Number 27, as follows: 
''You are instructed that a driver of a school bus 
is charged with the knowledge that children upon 
leaving said bus may be expected to act upon child-
ish instincts and impulses and cross a street or high-
way in front of said bus without looking and with-
out being mindful of their danger.'' 
5. That the court erred in denying appellant's re-
quested instruction Number 28, as follows: 
''You are instructed that a person driving a school 
bus rriust expect children to be thoughtless of prior 
instructions, and must expect them to do the things 
children are ~pt to do, and must take such precau-
tions and must do those things which the law and 
regulations require him to do for their safety. 
''You are further instructed that the regulations 
-··~ 4 ~··-
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of the State Road Co1nn1ission and the State Board 
of Eduration, adopted pursuant to law, provide that 
the driver of the bus shall require all pupils to pass 
behind the bus rather than in front of the bus, and 
require that a srhool bus shall not pick up or let off 
pupils except at regularly designated stops, and that 
the bus shall not be stopped in line of traffic to load 
or unload pupils.'' 
6. That the court erred in denying appellant's re-
quested instruction N lunber 31, as follows: 
''If you find from the evidence that the defendant 
\V-. Ed Bingham could have required the deceased 
child Lawrence P. Dawson to pass behind rather 
than in front of the bus by definite, clear, or positive 
instructions, or by stopping his bus in such a posi-
tion, or at such a place, as would require it, and that 
said defendant did not do so, then you will find that 
he was negligent, and you find in favor of the plain-
tiff and against the defendant.''_ 
7. That the court erred in denying appellant's re-
ctnested instruction Number 32, as follows: 
"If you find fron1 the evidence that the defendant 
W. Ed Binghan1 could have stopped his bus in such 
a position, or at such a place, that the deceased child 
Lawrence P. Dawson would have been required to 
pass behind rather than in front of said bus, and that 
said defendant did not do so, then you will find that 
he vvas negligent, and you will find in favor of the 
plaintiff and against said defendant.'' 
8. That the court erred in denying appellant's re-
quested instruction Nun1ber 33, as follows: 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
''You are instructed that it was the duty of the de-
fendant W. Ed Bingham to stop and discharge the 
deceased child Lawrence P. Dawson, and the other 
school children, at a regularly designated bus stop. 
If you find from all of the evidence that he did not do 
so, then you will find that his failure so to do was 
negligence ·as a matter of law. And you will find in 
favor of the plaintiff and against said defendant.'' 
9. The court erred in giving its instruction Number 
12, as follows : 
' 'You are instructed that there is no evidence in 
this case that defendant W. Ed Bingham stopped 
said school bus in a place which was not a regularly 
designated bus stop and this claim of negligence is 
withdrawn from your consideration.'' 
10. That the court erred in giving its instruction 
Number 13, as follows : 
·· ' 'You are instructed that there is no evidence in 
this case that immediately prior to said accident, the 
defendant W. Ed Bingham stopped said school bus 
in line of traffic to unload pupils and this claim of 
. negligence is withdrawn from your consideration.'' 
11. That the court erred in giving its instruction 
Number 14, as follows: 
"You are instructed that it was the duty of the de-
fendant, Ed Bingham, to stop his bus in such a posi-
tion and at such a place to require the children to 
pass behind rather than in front of his bus. If you 
find from the evidence that said defendant did not 
do so, then you will find that he was negligent, and 
-··~ 6 ~··-
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if you further find that said negligence 'vas a proxi-
mate cause of the injuries and death complained of, 
you \vill find in favor of the plaintiff and against the 
defendant, W. Ed Bingha1n, and award plaintiff 
dan1ages; provided ho,vever, you further find that 
the deceased boy "Tas not guilty of contributory 
negligence.'' 
12. That the court erred in giving its instruction 
Number 15, as follows: 
~'You are further instructed that defendant W. Ed 
Bingham "Tas not negligent because he did not take 
the alternate route and stop his bus on the so-called 
bridge stop. It was his legal right to take the route 
along high,vay U -38 traveling northward.'' 
ARGUMENT 
It is our three-fold contention that: (1) The lower 
court erred in refusing to instruct the jury that the re-
spondent \V. Ed Bingham was guilty of negligence as a 
1natter of law, and in failing to submit to the jury, with 
respect to the respondent W. Ed Bingham, the single 
question as to the amount of damages. (2) That the court 
erred in submitting to the jury the question of contribu-
tory negligence on the part of the deceased child Law-
rence P. Dawson, for the reason that the statute (Sec-
tion 57-7-177, Utah Code Annotated, 1943) defined and 
characterized the respondent W. Ed Binghan1's actions 
as ''misconduct''; that misconduct goes beyond negli-
gence and arnounts to negligence per se in effect, and 
preeludes any defense of contributory negligence. ( 3) 
The lower court, having refused to instruct the jury that 
the respondent \V. Ed Bingharn \Vas guilty of negligence 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
as a matter of law, erred in denying appellant'~· motion 
for a new trial, for the reason that the verdict was 
against the weight of the evidence. 
First: 
The pertinent sections of the Utah Code read as fol-
lows: 
Section 57.;,7-176. Commission to Regulate Design and 
Operation of School Buses. 
''The state road commission by and with the ad-
vice of the state board of education shall adopt and 
enforce regulations not inconsistent with this act to 
govern the design and operation of all school buses 
for the transportation of school children when owned 
and operated by any school district . . . . Ev-
~ry school district, its officers and employees, .... 
shall be subject to said regulations.'' 
Section 57-7-177. Id. Violation of Regulations-Penalty. 
''Any officer or employee of any school district 
who violates any of the regulations provided for in 
the next preceding section . . . . shall be guilty of 
misconduct and subject to removal from office or 
employment ..... '' 
Pursuant to the authority and direction of these sec-
tions of the Code the Utah State Road Commission, by 
and with the advice of the State Board of Education 
promulgated the following regulations: 
1. Chapter 2, Paragraph 2-2 (a) 
''The school bus shall not pick up or let off pu-
pils except at regularly designated stops.'' 
-··..af 8 )5.··-
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2. Paragraph 2-2(b) 
''The bus shall not be stopped in line of traffic 
to load or unload pupils. (Note: Widened should-
ers where desirable for stops will be provided 
upon application.) '' 
3. Chapter 2, Paragraph 2-2 (c) 
"The driver shall require all pupils to pass be-
hind rather than in front of the bus.'' 
The respondent W. Ed Bingham flew directly in the 
face of these requirements and drove where he pleased 
and stopped where he pleased, with the result that the 
very tragedy which the law and the regulations were de-
signed to prevent did occur. 
The section first quoted above (57-7-176) provides, 
among other things, that "Every school district, its of-
ficers and employees, .... shall be subject to said regula-
tions." Section 57-7-177 provides that "Any officer or 
employee of any school district who violates any of the 
regulations provided for in the next preceding section ... 
shall be guilty of misconduct and subject to removal from 
office or employment.'' (Italics ours). 
Obviously, the Legislature had determined that the 
lives of school children of this state were invaluable and 
had sought to throw every possible safeguard around · 
them, and had fixed the punishment of those who violated 
the regulations which the Legislature intended to have 
established as a procedure of safe conduct. 
The law and the regulations provided that the respond-
ent W. Ed Binghan1 should require the school children 
\vhen alighting- fron1 the school bus to pass to the rear of 
---~ 9 l5<·,·-
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and behind the bus. The reason for the requirement is 
evident. By requiring them to pass behind the bus, the 
children would be in the· best possible position to protect 
themselves from oncoming traffic. In that position they 
would have a clear vision of traffic coming from the rear, 
unobstructed by the school bus; and they themselves 
\Vould be visible to oncoming traffic. 
"Whether the Legislature enacts a safety statute, 
it declares that injury from violation of it is reason-
. ably to be anticipated. The Legislature establishes 
the standard of care to be exercised and liability for 
injury resulting from violation of the standard fol-
lows. Osborne v. Montgomery, 203 Wis. _223, 240, 241, 
234 N. W. 372." 
B~tts v. Ward, et al., 227 Wis. 
387, 279 N. W. 6, 116 A. L. R. 1441 
"The view that the violations of a statute may 
constitute actionable negligence is predicated upon 
the principle that when an ~ct is forbidden by ex-
press provision of law, the standard of the legisla-
ture becomes absolute, and one who perpetrates the 
prohibited act will be deemed to be liable regardless 
of whether the resulting injury might have been 
foreseen by a prudent person.'' 
38 Am. Jr. 831, 832, Sec. 160 
and cases cited. 
In Peterson v. Standard Oil Co., 55 Or. 511, 106 Pac. 
337, Am. Cas. 1912-A. 625, the court stated in part (106 
Pac. 341): 
''It is to be regretted that two or three authorita-
tive courts have fallen into the aberration of hold-
ing that the violation of a statute, or municipal or-
-··~ 10 ~··-
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dinance, enacted for the public safety, does not estab-
lish negligence per se; but is 1nerely 'vhat the books 
term • evidence of negligence '-that is to say, conlpe-
tent but not conclusive evidence, to be subn1itted to 
the jury on the question of negligence or no negli-
gence. It seems to have escaped the attention of the 
judges who have laid do'vn this rule that it has the 
effect of clothing com1non juries with the dispensing 
power-the power to set aside acts of the Legisla-
ture-a power exercised by the early Kings of Eng-
land, though its exercise was odious to our ancestors, 
~o much so that the exercise of it disappeared with 
the Tudors. 
''Whatever Inay be the rule where the measure of 
care is prescribed by the by-la,vs of a municipal cor-
poration, logic and reason would seem to indicate 
that, where the laws of the state for the protection of 
the public have prescribed that certain precaution 
shall be observed in the labelling of kerosene and 
distillates, such requirements constitute a legislative 
declaration of the minimum of care necessary under 
the circun1stances, and that a less degree of care is 
negligence as a matter of law, and that the pleading 
and proof necessary in case of injury arising under 
such circumstances need only show the greach of 
the statutory requirements, the fact that such breach 
was the proximate cause of the injury, and the dam-
ages sustained thereby.'' 
In a case discussing a statute requiring an audible 
warning when approaching pedestrians, the Michigan 
Court said, in the case of Johnston v. Cornelius, 166 N. 
W. 983, 985, in part: 
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"It lays a statutory duty upon drivers of automo-
biles, which may be greater than the duty of exercis-
ing ordinary prudence; but the driver of automo-
biles must, nevertheless, discharge such duty or re-
spond for its neglect. Levyn v. Koppin, 183 Mich. 
232, 149. N. W. 993." 
Second: 
The Legislature laid down the rules. It wanted them 
obeyed for the protection of school children. It fixed pen-
alties for violation. It said that a person breaking the 
rules would be ''guilty of misconduct.'' 
We must presume that the Legislature used the word 
''misconduct'' advisedly when enacting the law quoted 
above (57-7-177). It becomes important, therefore, to ex-
amine the meaning of the word ''misconduct,'' with 
which violations of these important code sections were 
characterized, in order to understand the importance 
which the Legislature attached to those sections, and in 
order to understand its determination to safeguard the 
lives of school children. 
The term ''misconduct'' is a much stronger word than 
''negligence.'' It goes far beyond negligence in scope and 
meaning and responsibility. In the case of Mandella vs. 
~v.Iariano, 200 A tl. 4 78 (Rhode Island, 1938) the Court 
said in part : 
''This is an action for negligence, and negligence, 
speaking generally, is a relative term in1plying fail-
ure to comply with an indefinite rule of conduct in 
. the circumstances of any particular case. Intent is 
not an essential elen1ent of negligenee. The tern1 
-··~ 12 ~··-
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'n1isconduct ', on the other hand, in1plies a wrong 
intention and not a mere error of judgment; it im-
plies fault beyond the error of judgment .... 
"In all the dictionaries that we have consulted, 
whether law dictionaries or those in general use, 
such as Ballantine, Black, Webster's New Interna-
tional, and \Vinston's Simplified dictionary, the 
term 'misconduct' is defined as a transgression of 
some established and definite rule of action; a for-
bidden act; a dereliction from duty; unlawful be-
havior; wilful in character; improper or wrong 
behavior. Where synonyms are given, the synonym-
ous terms are misdemeanor, misdeed, misbehavior, 
delinquency, impropriety, mismanagement, offense. 
'Negligence' or 'carelessness' is not included in the 
synonyms for 'misconduct'. See 40 C. J. 1221 to the 
same effect. 
"Unless a word has a definite technical meaning, 
in which case it is to be given that meaning, a word 
in common use is ordinarily held to convey the mean-
ing that attaches. to it in usual parlance. We are sat-
isfied that the term 'misconduct', both in law and in 
ordinary speech, usually ilnplies the willful doing of 
an act with a wrong intention .... 
''The case of Citizens' Insurance Co. v. Marsh, 41 
Pa. 386, is the only one of many decisions examined 
by us, where the issue was somewhat analogous to 
the one in the instant case. That case has been cited 
in later years as an authority for the general propo-
sition that the term 'misconduct' implies Inalfeas-
ance or unla-,vful conduct. There the plaintiff brought 
-··~ 13 ~··-
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suit on a policy of insurance for the burning of a 
steamboat. The defense set up that the burning was 
due to 'misconduct' on the part of the captain and 
not the result of ordinary negligence or carelessness. 
The facts showed that the captain had engaged his 
boat in a race with another steamboat; that, in order 
to secure extra steam, he had a barrel of turpentine 
brought out of the hold and the head knocked out; 
that he ordered the barrel placed in front of the 
boiler, so that the fuel could be saturated with tur-
pentine immediately before being put into the boiler; 
that fuel so saturated caught fire, which, spreading 
first to the barrel of turpentine, and then to the boat 
itself, finally resulted in the burning of the boat. An 
act of congress in force at that time required that 
turpentine be kept in metalic containers or compart-
ments lined with metal and at a secure distance 
from any fire. 
"In reversing a decision for the plaintiff, the ap-
pellate court draws a sharp distinction between 'neg-
ligence' and 'misconduct'. At page 394 of the opin-
ion above cited, the court says: 'These views may 
help to draw the distinction between mere negli-
gence, carelessness, or unskilfulness, and miscon-
duct. It seems to us that, in usual parlance, when 
these terms are contradistinguished, n1isconduct 
means a transgression of some established and defi-
nite rule of action, where no discretion is left, except 
what necessity may demand; and that carelessness, 
negligence, and unskilfulness are transgressions of 
some established but indefinite rule of action, vvhere 
some descretion is necessarily left to the actor. Mis-
-··4Jf 14 ~··-
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eon duct is a violation of definite law; carelessness, 
an abuse of discretion under an indefinite law. Mis-
conduct is a forbidden act; carelessness, a forbidden 
quality of an act, and is necessarily indefinite'." 
It is interesting to note that. in the Citizens Insurance -~ "-
Co. v. Marsh case supra, the"~ s-tante ''required that tur-
pentine be kept in metallic containers or con1partments 
lined with metal and at a secure distance from any fire." 
So far as appears fron1 the reference to that question by 
the Rhode Island Court, the statute itself did not charac-
terize the violation as 'n1isconduct' but the court found 
that the captain's action was misconduct. 
We are not left to any speculation in the case at bar. 
Here the statute itself brands the violation as .'miscon-
duct' and prescribed the punishment therefor. The viola-
tion of the statute and the regulations, therefore, cannot 
be the subject of debate as to its meaning. 
Along this same line "\Ve quote at length fro1n 38 An1. 
Jr. pp 854, 855: 
"178.-Wilful, Wanton, or Reckless Conduct.-
There is an abundance of authority for the propo-
sition that contributory negligence is not a defense 
in an action based upon wilful or wanton misconduct 
or intentional violence. Even in jurisdictions where 
the doctrine of comparative negligence is rejected as 
a general principle of the common law, contributory 
negligence is no defense to an action based on the 
defendant's reckless, 'vilful, wanton, or intention~! 
misconduct. There is no more reason for permitting 
the defense of contributory negligence in a case 
where the injury was cause by wilful, wanton, or 
reckless 1nisconduct, than ·there is for permitting it 
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in a case of assault and battery. No court has ques-
tioned the soundness of this proposition so far as in-
juries intentionally inflicted are concerned. So far as 
wanton conduct is concerned, some discernment must 
be exercised by the courts, or the defense of contri-
butory negligence will be barred in any case merely 
by the artifice of describing the conduct of the de-
fendant as wanton. The distinction between negli-
gence and wilful and wanton misconduct is well de-
fined. Although conduct of the defendant precluding 
the defense of contributory negligence has been 
called negligence with such qualifying adjectives as 
'gross,' 'wanton,' 'reckless,' or 'wilful,' strictly 
speaking this is an incorrect and misleading use of 
the word 'negligence.' Negligent conduct, whatever 
may be the characterization applied to it, is not suf-
ficient to preclude the defense of contributory negli-
gence. A defendant's act is properly characterized 
as willful, wanton, or reckless, within the meaning 
of the foregoing rule, only when it was apparent, or 
reasonably should have been apparent, to the de-
fendant that the result was likely to prove disastrous 
to the plaintiff, and he acted with such an indiffer-
ence toward, or utter disregard of, such a conse-
quence that it can be said he was willing to perpe-
trate it. The elements necessary to characterize an 
injury as wantonly or wilfully. inflicted are ( 1) 
knowledge of a situation requiring the exercise of 
ordinary care and diligence to avert injury to an-
other, (2) ability to avoid the resulting harm by or-
dinary care and diligence in the use of the means at 
hand, and ( 3) the omission to use such care and dili-
gence to avert the threatened danger, when to the 
-·o~f 16 ~•••-
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ordinary mind it must be apparent that the result 
is likely to prove disastrous to another. If one wil-
fully injures another, or if his ron duct in inflicting 
the injury is so "'"anton or reckless that it amounts 
to the same thing, he is guilty of n1ore than negli-
gence. His conduct is characterized by wilfulness 
rather than by inadvertance; it transcends negli-
gence and is different in kind. Otherwise stated, the 
omission to use care and diligence to avert a threat-
ened danger to another constitutes conduct which 
precludes the defense of contributory negligence 
when it arises from a deliberate purpose to inflict 
injury and also when it is due to that reckless dis-
regard for the safety of others to which the law im-
putes an intention to do harin. For an act to fall 
within the category of wanton or wilful negligence, 
'Yhich renders the defense of contributory negligence 
unavailable to a n1otorist who is charged with negli-
gence, it need not spring from ill will or wear a 
cloak of malicious intent .... '' 
Referring to the foregoing ''elements necessary to 
characterize an injury as wantonly or wilfully inflicted,'' 
attention is invited to the fact that in the case at bar 
the respondent had more than a knowledge of the danger-
ous situation, he had a legal requirement to observe. 
Third: 
Appellant's motion for a new trial should have been 
granted as against the respondent W. Ed Bingham for 
the reason that the verdict of the jury was against the 
great weight of the evidence which conclusively shows 
that entirely aside from the laws and regulations govern-
ing student transportation heretofore set forth he was 
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careless and negligent and guilty of misconduct in the 
following respects and for the following reasons: He 
was an experienced driver, having driven a bus for 18 
years (Tr. p. 183), and he was charged with knowledge of 
the Laws and Regulations relating to the driving of 
school buses (Tr. p. 231). He knew of the dangerous in-
tersection at Highway U-38 and 4800 South Street (Tr. 
pp. 193, 194) and of the speed of automobiles passing 
along U-38 and 4800 South Street (Tr. p. 193). He knew 
of a previous accident involving a student at that inter-
section ( Tr. p. 189). Although on previous occasions he 
had instructed his student passengers on what to do, he 
did not do so on the date of this accident ( Tr. pp. 130, 
131, 193, 194, 214, 235). He had permitted, or by the 
place he stopped t~e bus had required, children to pass in 
front of the school bus on pr~vious occasions ( Tr. p. 145). 
IIe had on various occasions changed the route of the 
bus (Tr. pp. 185, 186) and had stopped at different places 
both on Highway U-38 and on 4800 South Street (Tr. pp. 
98, 127, 185, 186, 187, 225). The area for stopping was 
wider on the northeast corner of U -38 ( Tr. p. 198). There 
was no designated bus stop either on U-38 or 4800 South 
Street as required by law, and he used his own judgment 
as to where he stopped (Tr. p. 188). On the day of the 
accident it had been raining and he parked the bus for 
discharge of students on the southeast corner of the in-
tersection of Highway U-38 and 4800 South Street in 
line of traffic (Tr. pp. 21, 42, 43), and in such a position 
that students proceeding west on 4800 South Street were 
compelled to go in front of the bus rather than behind 
it because of a ditch bank, mud and weeds (Tr. pp. 22, 
23, 25, 43, 53, 139, 209, 216, 221). On the day in question 
Lawrence P. Dawson, deceased, walked around the front 
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of the bus (Tr. p. 190) and was struck by an automobile 
being driven .by the defendant Guy Elias Carr (Tr. p. 
192) receiving injuries as a result of 'which the boy died. 
The ·evidence in this case discloses that Bingham in 
spite of regulations to the contrary, and in his own words, 
used his ~ • own judgn1ent'' as to where he would stop 
the bus for the discharge of students. He had no legal 
right to stop at the intersection in question at all, because 
no stop had been designated there, but despite that fact 
he assumed the responsibility for so doing, and did stop. 
The effect of -\Y". Ed Bingham's conduct in stopping the 
bus at various corners of the intersection resulted in con-
fusion to the student passengers, who varied in ages from 
6 to 14 years. At times he would stop on 4800 South Street 
facing west; at other times on u~38 on the southeast 
corner, and at other times he would proceed to the north-
east corner of the same intersection. At still other times 
he stopped a block or so south of the intersection to let 
students off. On the day of this accident he stopped the 
bus in such a position that children alighting from the 
bus could not go around "the back of the bus to proceed 
west because of wet weeds and mud caused by the rain. 
Mr. Bingham had· been driving the bus for n1any years, 
and entirely aside from the regulations· to the contrary 
in stopping as he did, knew or should have kno\vn that 
children in their youthful haste and in1pulse would go in 
front of the bus to get ho1ne. He did not take ti1ne to warn 
the1n of danger or to insist that they go behind the bus 
hut on the contrary assun1ed an indifferent attitude to-
wards the1n. In fact, he \vas so indifferent to their safety 
that he stopped the bus in sueh a position that they 
\vould ha.,.le heen foreed to 'valk in n1nd, through 'vet 
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weeds to go around the back of the bus. In addition to 
that-he could have proceeded across 4800 South Street 
as he had previously done and parked on the northeast 
corner in such a position that the children would have 
been forced to go behind the bus. This he failed to do. En-
tirely aside from the questions relating to negligence as 
a matter of law, and ''misconduct,'' and contributory 
negligence, heretofore discussed in this brief, and referr-
ing for the moment to the questions relating to negli-
gence in general, which evidently were the basis for the 
view of the lower court, we submit that the finding of the 
jury and the judgment of the court "no cause of action," 
as to the respondent W. Ed Bingham were contrary to 
the great weight of the evidence. Knowing the traffic 
danger at the intersection, knowing the actions and con-
duct and habits of children, knowing that he could stop 
the bus where children could not pass in front of it, and 
knowing that repeated warnings are necessary for the 
safety of children, yet W. Ed Bingham in total indiffer-
ence to the safety of these children took no steps what-
ever to protect or warn them on this day. There can be 
no question but what his negligence was one of the proxi-
mate causes of the accident which resulted in death to the 
boy Lawrence P. Dawson. 
CONCLUSION 
We respectfully submit that the verdict of the jury and 
the judgment of the court, as to the respondent \V. Ed 
Bingham, should be set aside and the case remanded for 
a new trial. 
Respectfully submitted, 
LEWIS J. WALLACE 
M. BLAINE PETERSON 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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